condemnation when initial attributions of malevolent intent are dominant. According to this perspective, whether perspective-taking leads individuals to be forgiving or punishing depends on the intentions they initially attribute to the moral transgressor.
An Intentions-Based Account of Perspective-Taking
We focus on the role of intentions in moral judgment to explicate when and why taking the perspective of a moral transgressor will increase or decrease condemnation. Both psychologically and legally, the nature of one's intentions is a critical element in moral evaluation (Heider & Simmel, 1944; Malle & Knobe, 1997; Malle & Nelson, 2003) . Most notably, transgressors are condemned and punished more when their acts are motivated by malevolent intentions compared with when those same acts are motivated by benevolent intentions (Alicke, 1992 (Alicke, , 2000 . Given that perspectivetaking focuses attention toward others' thoughts and intentions, and that the nature of a transgressor's intentions influences moral judgment, perspective-taking may be particularly impactful when evaluating moral transgressors.
Perspective-taking involves making inferences about the contents of a target's mind. Consequently, perspective-taking often results in perceivers elaborating on their own thoughts and knowledge (Epley et al., 2006) . In the case of perspective-taking with a moral transgressor, we suspect that perspective-taking will lead people to further elaborate on their initial attributions of the transgressor's malevolent or benevolent intentions.
Our primary argument is that perspective-taking amplifies the intentions initially attributed to a transgressor, which in turn determines the magnitude of moral judgment toward the transgressor (see Figure 1) . 2 We predict that when benevolent intentions are initially attributed to a transgressor, perspective-taking amplifies those benevolent intentions and, in turn, decreases condemnation of the transgressor. In contrast, when malevolent intentions are initially attributed to a transgressor, perspective-taking amplifies those malevolent intentions and, in turn, increases condemnation of the transgressor. In this way, perspective-taking is like a spotlight: When shined on a transgressor's mind, perspective-taking further illuminates the malevolent or benevolent intentions the perceiver initially attributed.
Perspective-Taking Versus Empathy
To further establish the role of intentionality in our perspectivetaking predictions, we compare the effects of perspective-taking with those of empathy, the simulation of a target's feelings and emotions.
3 Like perspective-taking, empathy is an otheroriented social cognitive process that tends to promote positive social consequences (Batson et al., 1997) . Unlike perspectivetaking, however, empathy emphasizes focusing on others' feelings and emotions rather than their thoughts and intentions (Davis, 1980) . Supporting this distinction, previous research finds that perspective-taking, compared with empathy, is more consequential in strategic social interactions. For instance, in negotiations and war games, perspective-taking boosts understanding of the counterpart's strategic intentions and increases performance, but empathizing does not (Galinsky et al., 2008; Gilin, Maddux, Carpenter, & Galinsky, 2013) . Our main prediction was that, because empathy does not prompt an increased focus on intentions, empathy will not increase condemnation of a malevolently intentioned moral transgressor. Based on past empathy research, we expect that, like perspective-taking, empathy will reduce condemnation when benevolent intentions are attributed.
Study Overview and Theoretical Contributions
We conducted four experiments to test our predictions. In Experiments 1A-2, employees recalled an unethical Note. Perspective-taking amplifies the intentions initially attributed to a transgressor, which in turn determines the magnitude of moral condemnation toward the transgressor. transgression in their organization and made moral judgments about the transgressor. Malevolent intention attributions were measured (Experiments 1A-1B) and manipulated (Experiment 2). We predicted that perspective-taking prior to making moral judgments would increase condemnation when malevolent intentions were attributed to the transgressor but reduce condemnation when benevolent intentions were attributed. In Experiment 3, we tested the influence of perspective-taking on costly punishment behavior in a modified dictator game. We predicted that perspective-taking would increase costly punishment toward a selfish dictator and that malevolent intention attributions would mediate this effect. Each study included an empathy control condition, which provided a test of discriminant validity. Like perspective-taking, empathy prompts otherfocused cognition, but because it does not direct attention toward intentions per se, we did not expect empathy to increase condemnation when malevolent intentions were attributed.
This research makes important theoretical contributions. Our intentions-based account of perspective-taking helps explain a number of perspective-taking's divergent effects. When perspective-takers see transgressors through a jaundiced and condemning lens, they act more negatively than if perspective-taking had not taken place. This research also contributes to prior work distinguishing between perspective-taking and empathy by showing that only perspective-taking amplifies moral condemnation when the transgressor is attributed malevolent intentions. Finally, the research contributes to the moral judgment literature by showing how different forms of mental simulation and consideration can fundamentally alter moral judgments.
Experiment 1A: Measured Intentions
In Experiment 1A, participants recalled an unethical transgression in their organization and then categorized the transgressor's intentions as malevolent or nonmalevolent. 4 Participants were then randomly assigned to a perspectivetaking, empathy, or control condition. We expected that malevolent intentions plus perspective-taking would increase condemnation and that nonmalevolent intentions plus perspective-taking would reduce condemnation. We also predicted that empathy would not increase condemnation.
Participants and Design
Four-hundred and ninety-one respondents were recruited from Amazon's Mechanical Turk (Mturk) to complete a survey on organizational behavior. Our target sample size was 500 participants, or around 80 participants per analysis condition. When asked to recall an unethical transgression in their organization, 232 (46%) respondents were able to do so, and 12 people failed an attention check, leaving 220 for analysis (M age = 32.68, SD age = 10.50; 37% women). Everyone worked full-time: 65% nonmanagerial, 32% middle-management, and 3% senior management. We address issues of statistical power in Experiment 1B.
Participants were randomly assigned to one of three experimental conditions: perspective-taking, empathy, or control. We also measured intentions and coded responses as either malevolent or nonmalevolent.
Our final design for analysis was a 2 (intentions: malevolent, nonmalevolent) × 3 (condition: perspective-taking, empathy, control) between-participants framework.
Procedure
Respondents were asked to recall an unethical transgression in their organization that did not involve them. We defined an unethical transgression as occurring "when employees engage in any form of lying, cheating, or stealing to benefit themselves at the expense of someone else in the organization or the organization itself." Common transgressions involved the theft of money or company property and bribing potential clients; less common transgressions included sexual harassment and physical violence.
Intentions. After respondents indicated that they could recall a transgression, we asked them to categorize the transgressor's motives into one of six categories that represented, a priori, two broad intention categories: malevolent and nonmalevolent intentions. Malevolent intentions included transgressions categorized as "malicious/negative intentions" or "desire to harm another person." Nonmalevolent intentions included transgressions categorized as "the transgression was accidental, 5 " "the circumstances drove the person to the behavior," or "unsure about intentionality." The sixth category was open-ended, letting participants write their own response in a text box.
Respondents rated 75 recalled transgressions (34%) as malevolent and 115 (52%) as nonmalevolent; 29 respondents (13%) used the free-response category. Two coders who were blind to the hypotheses categorized the free responses as either malevolent or nonmalevolent. To be coded as malevolent, the free response needed to describe unambiguous intent to harm another person or the organization. This strict criterion resulted in all of the free responses being categorized as nonmalevolent. Thus, our analysis included 75 malevolent (34%) and 145 nonmalevolent transgressions (66%).
Manipulations. We manipulated perspective-taking and empathy with a writing task. These manipulations were directly drawn from Galinsky et al. (2008) and Gilin et al. (2013) . All participants were asked to write a few sentences in response to the manipulation prompt. In the perspectivetaking condition, participants were asked to "focus your attention on the thoughts of the person involved. Try to understand what that person was thinking. What thoughts do you think were going through that person's head while engaging in the unethical behavior?" In the empathy condition, they were asked to "focus your attention on the by guest on September 21, 2016 psp.sagepub.com Downloaded from emotions of the person involved. Try to understand what that person was feeling. What feelings and emotions do you think that person was feeling while engaging in the unethical behavior?" Participants were asked to write a few sentences in response to the prompt. The control condition participants wrote about the transgression with no additional prompt.
Measures. As in previous research, we measured moral condemnation with questions that tapped judgments of the transgression, judgments of the transgressor, and whether the transgressor should be punished (Effron, Lucas, & O'Connor, 2015; Effron & Monin, 2010; Polman, Pettit, & Wiesenfeld, 2013) . These 15 items were averaged into a condemnation index (α = .93). Five items assessed how much the transgression was dishonorable, immoral, inexcusable, unethical, and justifiable (1 = not at all, 9 = extremely). Eight bipolar scale items assessed perceptions of the transgressor: cruel-kind, nice-awful, cold-warm, honest-dishonest, unfair-fair, moralimmoral, good-bad, likeable-dislikable (9- point scales anchored by the trait words). Two items assessed desire to punish the transgressor by asking participants how much they agree with the statements "This person should be punished harshly for his or her behavior" and "No organization should hire this person" (1 = disagree strongly, 9 = agree strongly).
Results
A 2 (intentions: malevolent, nonmalevolent) × 3 (condition: perspective-taking, empathy, control) analysis of variance (ANOVA) on condemnation found a significant main effect for intentions, F(1, 214) = 30.10, p < .001, η 2 = .12, and a nonsignificant main effect of condition, F < 1, η 2 = .004. As predicted, there was a significant interaction, F(2, 214) = 5.29, p = .006, η 2 = .04. Means and standard deviations appear in Table 1 .
When people made attributions of nonmalevolent intentions, perspective-taking significantly reduced condemnation compared with the control condition, t (214) Consistent with our intentions-based account of perspective-taking, when a transgression was attributed to nonmalevolent intentions, perspective-taking decreased condemnation of the transgressor. However, when a transgression was attributed as having malevolent intentions, perspective-taking increased condemnation compared with a control condition.
Experiment 1B: Measured Intentions
Because many Experiment 1A respondents did not recall an ethical transgression, our sample was smaller than anticipated. Experiment 1B replicated the findings of Experiment 1A with a larger sample. To increase response rates, Experiment 1B expanded the definition of "unethical behavior" to include selfish behaviors. Aside from this change, Experiment 1B directly replicated Experiment 1A.
Participants and Design
Eight-hundred four participants were recruited from Mturk. Five did not recall a transgression, and 33 failed an attention check, leaving 766 for analysis (M age = 33.30, SD age = 9.55; 47% women). Everyone was employed full-time: 65% in nonmanagerial, 31% in middle-management, and 4% in senior management positions. We randomly assigned the participants to one of three experimental conditions: perspective-taking, empathy, control. We also measured intentions and coded participants' responses as either malevolent or nonmalevolent. Our final design for analysis was a 2 (intentions: malevolent, nonmalevolent) × 3 (condition: perspective-taking, empathy, control) between-subjects framework.
Procedure
We suspected that Experiment 1A's response rate may have resulted from our strict definition of "unethical behavior." In Experiment 1B, the definition was broadened to include selfish behaviors that might cause harm to others (see Dubois, Rucker, and Galinsky, 2015 , for a discussion of the link between selfish and unethical behavior). Specifically, we added the following instruction: "If you cannot think of an example of unethical behavior, think about a time when someone behaved selfishly, or had the opportunity to benefit a colleague or the organization but chose not to."
Care was taken to ensure that these instructions did not lead people to recall behaviors that might be considered more petty than unethical. Two judges read each response and coded whether the transgression led to a harmful or unfair outcome for another party. All responses met this criterion. Responses included a wide range of transgressions and victims. For instance, one participant recalled a colleague who lied about being sick, which forced a coworker work a double-shift and to cancel an important family event.
Other transgressions were more blatantly unethical. For instance, several participants recalled instances of superiors stealing money from the organization or manipulating the organization's incentive system.
Intention category coding. Like Experiment 1A, participants categorized the transgressor's motives into the same set of six categories. Respondents rated 247 transgressions (32%) as malevolent and 406 (53%) as nonmalevolent; 113 respondents (15%) used the free-response category. Two coders who were blind to the participants' experimental condition categorized the free responses as either malevolent or nonmalevolent, r(113) = .71; discrepancies were resolved through discussion. To be coded as malevolent, free responses needed to identify intended or foreseeable harm (cf. Malle & Knobe, 1997) to another person or the organization. Of the free responses, 62 (55%) were categorized as malevolent and 51 (45%) were categorized as nonmalevolent. Thus, our analysis included 309 malevolent transgressions (40%) and 457 nonmalevolent transgressions (60%).
Measures
We measured condemnation with the same 15-item scale used in Study 1 (α = .93).
Results
A 2 (intentions: malevolent, nonmalevolent) × 3 (condition: perspective-taking, empathy, control) ANOVA on condemnation revealed a significant main effect for intentions, F(1, 760) = 182.43, p < .001, η 2 = .19, but no main effect of condition, F < 1, η 2 = .00. More importantly, the interaction was significant, F(2, 760) = 5.92, p = .003, η 2 = .02. Means and standard deviations appear in Table 1 .
When people made attributions of nonmalevolent intentions, perspective-taking significantly decreased condemnation compared with the control condition, t (760) These data replicated Experiment 1A's findings, with intentions influencing perspective-taking's effects. When our respondents' attributions of intent were nonmalevolent, perspective-takers were less condemning. However, when they were malevolent, perspective-taking increased condemnation.
Discussion
Experiments 1A and 1B support our intentions-based account of perspective-taking. In both experiments, the attribution of nonmalevolent intentions led perspective-taking to decrease condemnation. However, perspective-taking combined with malevolent intentional attributions increased condemnation. Empathy was less sensitive to intention attributions. As predicted, empathy did not increase condemnation following malevolent intention attributions in either experiment. Although Experiments 1A and 1B differed in whether empathy reduced condemnation following benevolent intention attributions, the fact that the combination of malevolent intentions and empathy never increased condemnation supports our model.
Experiment 2: Manipulated Intentions
Experiment 1 measured intentions and found that the consequences of perspective-taking with a moral transgressor depend on the nature of the intentions attributed to the transgressor. The goal of Experiment 2 was to replicate these findings while manipulating, rather than measuring, intentions.
Participants and Design
Four-hundred and four respondents were recruited from Mturk to complete a survey on organizational behavior. Forty-five people failed the attention check, leaving 359 for analysis (M age = 34.92, SD age = 10.93; 42% women). Everyone worked full-time: 53% nonmanagerial, 42% middle-management, and 5% senior management.
The experiment had a 2 (intentions: malevolent, nonmalevolent) × 2 (condition: perspective-taking, empathy) between-participants design.
Procedure
As in Experiment 1, respondents were asked to recall an unethical transgression in their organization.
Intentions manipulation. We manipulated whether participants recalled a transgression they believed to be malevolently intentioned or benevolently intentioned. We defined malevolent intentions as "intentions that are malicious, negative, or involve a desire to harm or undermine another person." We defined benevolent intentions as "intentions that are nonmalicious" and provided examples of nonmalicious motivations such as the desire to help a third party or accidents.
Perspective-taking and empathy manipulations. Once participants had a specific transgression in mind, we asked participants to write about the incident. Here, we manipulated whether participants engaged in perspective-taking or empathy with the transgressor, using same perspective-taking writing manipulation as in Experiment 1. 
Discussion
Experiment 2 manipulated the intentions of the moral transgressor and replicated the effects of the prior experiments that had involved measured intentions. A perspective-taking manipulation decreased condemnation when the transgressor was seen as having benevolent intentions, but increased condemnation compared with empathy when the transgressor was attributed as having malevolent intentions. Overall, perspective-taking amplified the intentions initially attributed to a transgressor to produce either greater forgiveness or greater condemnation.
Experiment 3: Costly Punishment
The goal of Experiment 3 was to test how perspective-taking and intentions influence a behavioral outcome: costly punishment. Participants were third-party observers of a Dictator Game in which a selfish dictator kept all of a US$10 endowment. Previous research suggests such selfish allocations are perceived and condemned as unethical (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004; Miller, 2001; Sanfey, Rilling, Aronson, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2003) . Given this research, we expected most participants would attribute malevolent intentions to the dictator. Participants were then randomly assigned to the perspectivetaking condition or one of three control conditions (empathy, self-focus, or immediate reaction). Then they were given the opportunity to use their own US$5 endowment (which they could otherwise keep) to punish the dictator. We predicted that perspective-taking would amplify attributions of malevolent intent and, consequently, costly punishment compared with the other conditions.
Participants and Design
One hundred seventy-six students from a business school subject pool (M age = 20.54, SD age = 2.31; 59% women) were paid US$5 to participate. Our recruitment goal was 40 participants per condition. Twelve indicated they did not believe the dictator was a real person and three failed an attention check. These 15 were excluded, leaving 161 for analysis. Participants were randomly assigned to one of four experimental conditions: perspective-taking, empathy, self-focus, or immediate reaction.
Procedure
Participants arrived in groups of three to 13 and sat at individual computer stations in a large room. The instructions indicated that they would be randomly assigned to be Player 1 (the Dictator), 2 (the Receiver), or 3 (an Observer). In fact, all participants were Observers (Player 3). The computer then displayed the rules of the Dictator Game with punishment. Dictators received a US$10 endowment and decided how much, if anything, to allocate to Receivers. Observers received a US$5 endowment. After learning that the Dictator kept the entire US$10, Observers had an opportunity to use any portion of their US$5 to punish the Dictator: Any amount they allocated for punishment would cost Dictators twice as much.
Perspective-taking manipulation. Before participants made their punishment decisions, we manipulated the independent variable. In the perspective-taking condition, participants read the following:
Please take a few minutes and try to understand what Player 1 was thinking as he or she decided how to allocate the US$10. What thoughts do you think were going through Player 1's head? What reasons do you think influenced Player 1's decision?
In the empathy condition, participants read the following:
Please take a few minutes and try to understand what Player 1 was feeling as he or she decided how to allocate the US$10. What emotions do you think Player 1 experienced? What feelings do you think influenced Player 1's decision?
In the self-focus control condition, participants read, "What is your reaction to Player 1's decision of how to allocate the US$10?" In all three conditions, participants were asked to write a few sentences in response to the instruction prompt. Finally, because merely contemplating a decision can influence ethical responding (Rand, Greene, & Nowak, 2012; Zhong, 2011) , we included a second control condition, the immediate reaction condition, in which participants moved directly to the dependent measures.
Measures
Intentions. Participants rated the Dictator's intentions toward the Receiver on seven differential scale items, for example, benevolent-malicious and unfair-fair, and so on (7-point scales; α = .81).
Costly punishment. Participants next indicated how much of their US$5 endowment they would use to punish the Dictator, using a slider scale that increased in 5-cent increments from US$0 to US$5. Because the structure of the game involved deception, all participants received the full US$5 endowment plus their participation fee.
Manipulation checks.
To distinguish between the perspectivetaking and empathy manipulations, coders used 3-point scales to rate how much participants considered the Dictator's thoughts (0 = no attempt made, 1 = some consideration, 2 = much consideration), and the Dictator's feelings. To distinguish the self-focus condition, coders rated how much participants focused on their own or the Dictator's perspective (1 = mostly own perspective, 2 = mixed/ambiguous, 3 = mostly Dictator's perspective). Two coders, blind to condition, rated the responses of half the participants. Reliability was adequate for the thoughts, r(65) = .86, feelings, r(65) = .74, and perspective, r(65) = .76, measures. Thus, one coder went on to code the rest of the responses and that coder's ratings were used in the analysis.
Results
Manipulation checks. Analyses of the manipulation checks suggest that the manipulations were effective. Costly punishment. A one-way ANOVA on the amount of punishment revealed a significant main effect, F(3, 157) = 2.67, p = .050, η 2 = .05 (see Table 3 ). Perspective-takers punished significantly more than those in the self-focus, t (157 Intentions. A one-way ANOVA on perceptions of the Dictators' intentions was also significant, F(3, 157) = 3.38, p = .020, η 2 = .06. Perspective-takers attributed significantly more malevolent intentions to the dictator than those in the self-focus condition, t (157 Mediation. We tested whether attributions of malevolent intentions mediated the effect of perspective-taking on punishment (Figure 2 ). We used a bootstrapping procedure with 5,000 resamples and found a marginally significant indirect effect, b = .20, SE = .11, CI 95% = [−0.02, 0.42], p = .074.
Perspective-taking led participants to spend nearly twice as much of their own money to punish a selfish dictator compared with control participants, with attributions of malevolent intentions mediating this effect. These results, in a controlled experiment with real monetary stakes, provide further evidence of the important role of perspective-taking and intention attributions in the condemnation of a transgressor.
General Discussion
This research is the first to investigate the consequences of perspective-taking with a moral transgressor. It reveals that the combination of perspective-taking and attributing malevolent intentions to a transgressor uniquely increases condemnation and costly punishment.
Consistent with past work, Experiments 1A and 1B found that perspective-taking while attributing nonmalevolent intentions to a moral transgressor decreased condemnation; here, perspective-taking was the path to forgiveness. However, novel to the current studies, perspective-taking while attributing malevolent intentions increased condemnation. Thus, intentions moderated the effect of perspectivetaking on reactions to moral transgressors. In contrast, empathizing did not increase condemnation. Experiment 3 also found that perspective-taking uniquely increased costly punishment; perspective-takers were willing to use their own money to punish a selfish dictator and amplified attributions of malevolent intentions mediated this effect.
This research makes important theoretical contributions. Our intentions-based account of perspective-taking helps explain a number of perspective-taking's divergent effects. Note. Coefficients are standardized betas; *p < .05. **p ≤ .01. ***p < .001. Positive evaluations result when targets are depicted as having (or could be presumed to have) benevolent intentions (Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000; Johnson, 1975; Todd, Bodenhausen, Richeson, & Galinsky, 2011) , but evaluations are considerably less lenient and forgiving when targets are perceived as malevolent (Epley et al., 2006; Pierce et al., 2013) . In these latter cases, perspective-takers see transgressors through a condemning lens. This research also contributes to prior work that documents when the consequences of considering a target's thoughts versus a target's feelings diverge. This work finds that perspective-taking, but not empathy, is more consequential in strategic interactions where understanding the target's intentions is important for achieving desired outcomes (Galinsky et al., 2008; Gilin et al., 2013) . Similarly, the present work finds that perspective-taking amplifies moral condemnation to a greater extent than empathy when the transgressor is attributed as having malevolent intentions.
Future Directions
The present work focused on perspective-taking with moral transgressors and identifying intentions as an underlying mechanism. Although these effects emerged when participants recalled real transgressions and judged an actual behavior, future research should investigate whether these effects emerge in richer social environments, such as live interactions. Future research might also explore the mechanisms underlying the effects of empathizing with a moral transgressor. One possibility, which we call the "balance sheet" hypothesis, is that empathizing results in positive feelings toward the transgressor that counteract the transgressor's negative intentions. This is consistent with our finding that empathizing does not increase condemnation and, in some cases, when intentions are not malevolent, reduces condemnation. Another possibility, what we refer to as the "elaboration interference" hypothesis, is that empathizing interferes with the perceiver's elaboration of the transgressor's intentions. Future research might distinguish between these two accounts for how empathy relates to intentions and moral reactions.
Our intentions-based account of perspective-taking also has applied relevance. Although in some cases condemning a moral transgressor may be the appropriate response, in many situations, minimizing conflict is a priority. For example, some organizations participate in criminal reintegration programs in which former criminals work alongside nonoffenders. In these situations, encouraging perspective-taking without first considering perceived intentions could provoke conflict and harm performance. Only after some level of benevolence is established might people be encouraged to consider a transgressor's thoughts.
Conclusion
Perspective-taking is a critical cognitive capacity that pushes people to explore the minds of social targets. The present research supports an intention-based account of perspectivetaking. Four experiments demonstrated that the intentions attributed to a social target are a critical determinant of perspective-taking's consequences, as perspective-taking amplified the effects of participants' initial attributions. In particular, these results suggest that peering into the mind of a moral transgressor can lead to particularly harsh judgments and punishment.
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